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SUSSEX POLICE



THE KINCORA BOYS HOME, BELFAST,
AND KINDRED MATTERS

REPORT BY SIR GEORGE TERRY, CBE QPM DL.,
CHIEF CONSTABLE OF SUSSEX.

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POLICE HEADQUARTERS

LEWES BN7 2DZ

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CHIEF CONSTABLE OF SUSSEX.

TO: Sir John HERMON, OBE.,
Chief Constable,
Royal Ulster Constabulary.

SUBJECT : THE KINCORA BOYS HOME, BELFAST, AND
KINDRED MATTERS

1. This report is a summary, together with relevant background, of the enquiries carried out by myself at your request into the above subject. It should be read in conjunction with two separate reports by Detective Superintendent Gordon HARRISON and Superintendent Richard FLENLEY of the Sussex Force which detail the enquiries now completed, and whilst those two reports are of necessity inter-linked and with some duplication in particular, in general the report by Detective Superintendent HARRISON covers the criminal investigation aspects and that of Superintendent FLENLEY principally deals in detail with the allegations by the Press along with the background to them and all of their ramifications. Both of those reports are cross-referenced to the reports by the Royal Ulster Constabulary team headed by Detective Superintendent [REDACTED] the cross-referencing is considerable and, of course, all reports then link to the very many statements and exhibits.

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2. I shall endeavour in compiling this report to be constantly aware of what may be a quite wide readership in due course and so of necessity I must include to a fair measure some background

detail of which I know you already are fully aware.

3. To that end my introduction must be that the Kincora Boys Hostel located at 236 Upper Newtownards Road, Belfast, was opened in January 1958 by the Belfast City Council Welfare Department. It was a hostel for working boys aged 15-18 years and it continued to be used for that age group throughout its existence, although occasionally younger lads were accommodated for very short periods when space in more appropriate childrens homes was unavailable. The building was a detached house with on the ground floor an entrance hall, television room, dining room, kitchen, wash room and an office, with a door from the latter to a one bedroom flat with a separate bathroom and a private hallway which gave access to a side entrance. That flat was occupied by the officer in charge of the hostel, namely, Joseph MAINS (b. 31.7.29), from 1964 until the hostel's closure in 1980, although he had previously used just a bedroom there since 1958. The first floor of the building consisted of three bedrooms, each large enough to accommodate three single beds, and a fourth bedroom primarily reserved for a member of the residential staff. Also on that floor were three bathrooms, a toilet and an ironing room. Above that a two roomed attic was used occasionally as a make-shift bedroom for one person but primarily was intended as a store room and play room.

4. Thus at any one time the hostel was intended to accommodate nine boys and one or occasionally two residential staff; because of the occasional overflow from other hostels the numbers of boys did go up to twelve and one of the bedrooms was also utilised separately for an additional member of staff.

MY APPOINTMENT

5. Following an investigation by your enquiry team which resulted in the conviction of the three principal offenders and others, and then continuing press commentary and statements in the House of Commons, you issued statements on 18th February 1982 and on the same day the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland announced that you had requested H.M. Chief Inspector of Constabulary to appoint the Chief Constable of another Force to carry out an investigation. In consequence I agreed to carry out that task.

TERMS OF REFERENCE

6. These were summarised by the Secretary of State in the House as follows :-

"To investigate allegations about the way in which the Police have conducted their enquiries and in addition to have general oversight of the continuing investigations".

7. The part of the terms of reference concerning the investigation of allegations about the way in which the enquiries had been conducted referred to assertions that there had been a cover-up, and the second part of my terms of reference related to the ongoing enquiries then under way by your own investigation team. To me a natural consequence was also to put my mind to the possibility of operational or administrative inefficiency and inadequacy in the Force.

8. From the onset it was clear that it was not my direction to undertake an enquiry into the area of responsibility and the action by the Social Services Department, although inevitably my enquiries would have to touch upon them.

COMPOSITION OF MY TEAM

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9. It was very clear to me after an initial meeting with your Assistant Chief Constable, Mr. John WHITESIDE, OBE., and Detective Superintendent [REDACTED], that my task would have to go back some years and then forward to the present time. It was obvious and important to me that my team should be of a size, working directly to myself, that all could have a complete knowledge of all we gleaned. This was a very deliberate decision on my part and had I gone to a larger team then the problem of co-ordination would have been immense and the additional numbers would have splintered the knowledge and in no circumstances was I prepared to countenance omissions or oversight in the course of my investigation.

10. Therefore, I decided upon a very small team consisting only of myself and the following officers :-

Mr. Colin R. SMITH, B.Soc.Sc., FBIM., then Assistant Chief Constable in the Thames Valley Police Force, subsequently appointed as a Deputy Assistant Commissioner in the Metropolitan Police and due to a special assignment in London he had to withdraw from the team at an early date on 4th May 1982.

Detective Superintendent Gordon HARRISON, Sussex Police.

Superintendent Richard FLENLEY, Sussex Police and at that time a Chief Inspector but subsequently promoted in February 1983 to his present rank.

LIAISON WITH THE ROYAL ULSTER CONSTABULARY AND SOCIAL SERVICES DEPARTMENT

11. Throughout my enquiry the utmost co-operation has been forthcoming from officers in your Force and there has been no question at all of concealment or avoidance of liaison or supply of information whenever required. The same applies to the Social Services Department who have co-operated well with us and I would particularly mention here [REDACTED]

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EXTENT OF MY ENQUIRY

12. Initially it may have appeared to some that with my team, my enquiry would be a very simple matter of examining reports submitted prior to my involvement and then monitoring subsequent activity. In no way was I prepared to discharge my responsibility in that manner and I can only say that our work has been painstaking, in considerable depth - details of which I give later, and it is no exaggeration to say that the task has been a mammoth one, particularly bearing in mind that we have had to search as far back as 1958 to the present time in order to carry out the task allotted to us. This task has been one of great intricacy and very obvious importance, demanding as it were a re-enquiry of the whole. As one illustration alone between 1963 and January 1980 a total of 186 boys lived at the Kincora Hostel and the task of tracing as many of these as possible was less than easy bearing in mind the fact that they are literally scattered all over the United Kingdom with a few even further afield. Many are now married, settled and respectable. Despite every effort some in fact cannot be located.

THE BACKGROUND OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND SCENE

13. Between 1958 and the start of 1969 the overall scene in Northern Ireland was what I would describe as generally being under control by the civil authorities, but in 1969 and into the early 1970's the whole escalated into the very worst of the troubles the Province has experienced.

14. Much of the comment and the assertions in the media and elsewhere which undoubtedly prompted your reasons for seeking my enquiry were generated by what I can only describe as from

those with the benefit of hindsight, and I must use my own description here to say that the early part of the decade of the 1970's in Northern Ireland has been conveniently forgotten and the pressures upon the Police and others so readily overlooked. In that period civil unrest distorted, bruised and frankly corrupted the whole fabric and infra-structure of society. I must say that lawlessness, insecurity, conflict and fear permeated everywhere, with the result that the normal development and maturity of the young people was at the very least exposed to many additional problems and stresses. It is, therefore, also true to say that simultaneously the "establishment", by which I mean the Police and the Social Services in particular, was constantly under pressure.

15. The ultimate readership of this report must be reminded too that the Police Force, whose duty it is to maintain the status quo and help in holding society together, suffered enormous pressures and burdens of over work. The level of terrorism which erupted around 1969 whilst slowly reducing as the 70's progressed was ever present and was coupled with a high rate of murders and terrorist inspired robberies which of sheer necessity affected the style and efficiency of crime detection.

16. Whilst normal crime as we might call it due to heavy Military and Police patrolling was relatively low and the ratio of the size of the Police Force to the population was increased to well above that in England and Wales, the very threat to personal safety felt by every Police officer both in his private life as well as at work, and by members of the public who should have been

assisting the Police in their enquiries, was a serious barrier to efficiency in crime investigation and detection.

17. I can pinpoint, even more succinctly, the pressures upon the personnel in the particular Division which contained the Kincora Boys Home by reference to records at Mount Pottinger Police Station. That Station also housed a Divisional Headquarters and a Battalion and Company Headquarters of the Army. For a precise example of the pressure, the Station records for the period from 1st April to 30th June 1973 show seven riots of various severity, 73 incidents of stoning and 37 reports of severe damage. Additionally both the Police Station and officers from it were shot at, there was an abnormal number of fire calls and many reports of intimidation, and the searching of a number of houses by the Army requiring the presence of the Police. All of this was over and above the usual policing demands occasioned by road traffic accidents, normal sudden deaths, missing children and general Police work.

18. Itemised even more accurately there were the following incidents :-

- 16 explosions
- 26 calls of suspect/hoax bombs
- 1 murder
- 32 shooting incidents
- 3 kidnappings
- 19 searches when arms were found
- 26 robberies - most of them involving the use of firearms
- 95 burglaries
- 20 stolen cars
- 2 hijackings of cars with occupants
- 14 other assaults

19. Additional searches of the records show that there were 21 arrests for very serious crimes such as murder, possession of explosives and firearms and so on. One individual arrested was subsequently implicated in over a dozen sectarian murders which required additional Detectives being drafted onto the Division.

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

20. Our enquiries showed that as far back as 1967 a file was compiled in the Belfast Social Services Department which became known as the [REDACTED] after the Social Worker originating it. This file was never formally transmitted from that Department to the Police until

Detective Superintendent [REDACTED] enquiry began in 1980. There is

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s.F40(2) evidence that the file did come into the possession of a Detective Constable
s.F40(2)(a) some five years after the Senior Social Services management had
s.F40(2)(b) closed it without reference to the Police. Any objective opinion as
s.F40(3)(a) to what action the Police could reasonably be expected to initiate at that
s.F40(3)(ai) time on such out-dated and unsubstantiated information is bound to
conclude that it would only have relevance if it provided background
information to a current complaint. No such complaint had in fact
been made to the Police and in consequence the officer concerned merely
copied the file and sent it to Force Headquarters for information purposes.
Despite every possible investigation by me this copy of the [REDACTED]
cannot be traced as ever having been received at Headquarters. The
publicity accorded to assumptions as to its contents and that the original
ever disappeared was a gross distortion.

21. There was an incident of indecent assault on an inmate of another boys hostel in November 1970, not by any of those subsequently convicted, but by a teacher from a secondary school. That case was heard at Belfast Magistrates' Court on 27th May 1971 and was dismissed. That matter was looked into very thoroughly,

I am able to confirm, by your own Force's team in 1982 but no miscarriage of justice on the evidence available took place.

22. There were other indecent assaults known to the Social Services Department in the 1970's but definitely not referred to the Police.

23. In broad terms, the sequence of events then had a development when the Chief News Reporter of the Irish Independent Newspaper, Belfast, published an article on 24th January 1980 about rumours of widespread homosexuality and child prostitution at the Kincora Hostel, alleging that the facts were known within Social Service circles and my enquiries in this respect established that the source of the reporter's information lay within those Services. Before that article in fact was published a Member of Parliament was informed and the matter raised in the House of Commons subsequently.

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24. On 25th January 1980 your own team headed by D/Superintendent [REDACTED] (then a Detective Chief Inspector), commenced an investigation into the press allegations. Following initial enquiries Notice of Suspension was served by the Health and Social Services Board on 4th March 1980 on the following :-

- a] Joseph MAINS (b. 31.7.29),
the Officer in Charge of the Kincora Boys Hostel
- b] Raymond SEMPLE (b. 6.1.22),
the Deputy Officer
- c] William McGRATH (b. 11.12.16),
the House Father.

25. Subsequently on 16th December 1981 after enquiries by D/Superintendent [REDACTED] team all three appeared at Belfast Crown Court before the Lord Chief Justice, Lord LOWRY, when they pleaded guilty to offences of buggery, gross indecency and indecent assault, and were sentenced to, in the case of MAINS six years' imprisonment, SEMPLE five years, and McGRATH four years.

26. In passing sentence the Lord Chief Justice commented that many people would be surprised that such activity could continue for such a long period at the hostel without detection.

27. At the same Court three other men were given periods of imprisonment for similar offences in two other boys' homes in North Belfast, those offences coming to light as a result of D/Superintendent [REDACTED] enquiries. Two further men were convicted at Newtownards Crown Court for similar offences at yet another boys' home in County Down, and once more those offences were discovered by the same enquiry team.

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28. Needless to say press publicity has continued and politicians have made statements publicly and the consequence was the appointment of my enquiry team. The further enquiries by D/Superintendent [REDACTED] of your own Force continued at the same time.

CRIMINAL HOMOSEXUAL CONDUCT

29. Having regard to the considerable period over which offences had been committed, I think it is necessary here to say for the benefit of those inexperienced in investigation or those who may not have considered possible reasons, th

offences of homosexual conduct are uniquely difficult for the Police to detect and to investigate. In perhaps all other types of crimes it is true to say that a victim feels himself injured and aggrieved, with a natural resentment or even desire for revenge towards the offender.

30. In homosexual offences, however, the victim is usually embarrassed and frequently feels some personal guilt or shame, but in a few cases also shares a measure of sexual satisfaction or pleasure.

31. As a consequence victims of homosexual acts are considerably less likely to make a formal complaint and even less inclined to tell others what has occurred; often even close friends of victims will be unaware of the offences committed because the victims will want to conceal from them "their guilty secret".

32. Another factor not to be discarded easily, is that whereas so many people believe they can recognise in common terminology a "queer" when they see one, the very nature of the crime of homosexual misconduct makes it very difficult for anyone and most of all the Police to confront or accuse anyone without some significant and positive evidence. Whilst it is very easy for individuals or indeed the media to make broad allegations or innuendo, it is a totally different matter to be successful in the search for corroboration as opposed to assumption, and many potential witnesses in the Kincora cases were so desperately naive and lacking in worldliness as to be unaware of what is going on around them. My enquiries have shown that this applies very much to some, and I repeat some, persons in the Social Services Departments.

33. Even more relevant to the Kincora enquiry, when victims are unhappily youths of the type housed in boys' hostels, they are very much more vulnerable both to an initial approach because of their immature innocence, and also to their insecurity resulting from an absence for them of reliable friendships and surrounding family from whom they can gain example, guidance, support and comfort. Most, if not all of the victims in what has been called this Kincora affair, come from broken, very disturbed, inadequate and deprived backgrounds. Their intelligence was either low or had not been developed properly. On the aspect of insecurity they were probably for the first time in their lives receiving attention which they badly wished to retain, albeit rather ironically from their assailants.

34. The general secretive nature of a homosexual relationship, together with the fear in the case of the victims in the Kincora hostel that their mentors had the power to remove them from this security and so called comfort under threat of transfer, for example, to the less palatable environment of Borstal, undoubtedly accounts for the fact to a major extent, that such character destroying conduct could go on unrevealed for so long. This can be coupled with another paramount reason which was the complete absence of any complaint to the Police by a victim throughout the 22 years of the existence of the Kincora Boys' Hostel until your team under D/Superintendent ██████ sought them.

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RESPONSIBILITY OF THE SOCIAL SERVICES ELEMENT

35. As I have already mentioned my task was not to carry out an investigation into any shortcomings within the Social Services but inevitably I have been unable to avoid gathering information

or indeed being compelled to form some views. The most impressionable one in the latter category is that of the naivety and unworldliness which prevailed with some of the staff and this coupled with a lack of good manpower resources inevitably failed to develop any sense of awareness as to what was happening over the years or to draw attention of the Police to what seemed several times from the information I have gathered as an unsatisfactory situation.

36. To illustrate some of this, Joseph MAINS, who was in charge of the Kincora Hostel, was first appointed there in January 1958 when it was opened. At that time prospective employees were interviewed by the Welfare Committee, who invariably only had applicants to select from virtually without any professional qualifications. It is said that only 5% of residential staff in childrens homes at that time had any qualifications, now apparently the figure is around 15%. In those early days any qualification held was usually the Certificate in Residential Care of Children and Young Persons which was obtained after a year's course at a College of Further Education. Undoubtedly low salaries, long anti-social hours of duty and unsatisfactory working conditions all too often were the reasons for making the posts that needed to be filled extremely unattractive. That situation has improved over recent years but there still seems to be a real problem in finding suitably qualified residential staff of the calibre necessary for this very important work.

37. MAINS had [REDACTED] when appointed and his experience in welfare work consisted of having been

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38. The system in 1958 for the responsibility over children in care in Belfast rested with the Belfast City Welfare Department and evolved directly to the City Welfare Officer and the Welfare Committee. The management structure reached down through the Deputy Welfare Officer, Children's Officer, Assistant Children's Officer, to a Divisional Welfare Officer, to other Social Workers and their assistants. The latter of course were intended to have personal follow-up contact with children in the homes.

The residential homes were staffed by an officer in charge, a deputy and, where justified, house parents and ancillary staff like cleaners and cooks. The management of all of these people was direct to the Children's Officer and Principal Social Workers at the City Authority Headquarters.

39. Welfare Committee members had a statutory duty to visit the homes at least once a month and report to the Committee and this was arranged on a rota basis of the members. The Children's Officer was required also to visit the homes within his area on again a monthly basis and in Belfast at that time this was delegated to the Assistant Children's Officer for residential care.

40. Having outlined in skeleton form the structure in being when the trouble really started developing in this boys' hostel, I can only express a view that if the Social Workers at that time had established the desirable rapport with their charges, akin as it should have been to that of parent/child, some of the victims may well have been naturally inclined to confide in them on the events about which they were generally too shy to reveal. This naivety and consequent incompetence unwittingly deprived

the young victims of a reliable and understanding avenue of complaint which should have been generated.

41. There were some minimal instances where the confidences were such that a child did complain to their Social Worker. But there was all too often by the latter an inability to recognise that criminal offences were being pointed to or instances where their sometimes "trendy" views obliterated the significance of the matters and virtually condoned misconduct.

42. Here I now refer back to my earlier comments about homosexual practices; it is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that when my team re-interviewed former Kincora residents many of them made statements about how shocked and surprised they had been to learn of the allegations against MAINS. One would have thought, reading some of the headlines in the press, that the Kincora Hostel was virtually a male sex brothel. My enquiries and the evidence very fully re-searched show that this impression bears no relationship to the truth. In fact, we found nothing more than a number of separate, very secretive and nefarious relationships. These relationships were with only one exception, between the staff of hostels and the inmates, and the latter knew well the identity of their assailants or where appropriate their buggers. This entirely gives lie to the media assertions that the boys were made over to a variety of other males of unknown identity through the medium of any "prostitution ring".

43. Generally in other respects the hostel was well maintained domestically and other persons who visited but occasionally when the supervision could only be very casual, gave full credit to the staff employed there for the general conditions.

AIM OF MY ENQUIRY

44. Obviously I have probed in very considerable detail all of the aspects of the circumstances in which homosexual men employed by the Eastern Health and Social Services Board were able to commit sexual offences on a number of boys in their care over a period of 22 years and at the same time to see if any blame could be apportioned to the Police and to indicate if any other agency could be faulted.

45. Additionally I have examined the work done by your R.U.C. team who enquired into the Kincora affair following the matter being first raised in a newspaper article in January 1980, and seeking particularly evidence of a suggestion that the officers concerned had failed to identify or bring to justice people who were said to have blocked previous enquiries.

46. My enquiry also has sought to clarify that which is fact and that which is fiction concerning allegations that a homosexual prostitution ring existed involving British officials in the Northern Ireland Office, Policemen, legal figures, businessmen and boys in care at the Kincora Hostel and other homes.

47. Finally I have directed full attention to the continuing R.U.C. enquiry which I was required to contemporaneously oversee.

INVESTIGATORY STRATEGY

48. Of necessity there was some degree of overlapping between my aims of looking into the first R.U.C. investigation of the preceding period and your team who were conducting their ongoing enquiries. I also decided to independently inve

matters in parallel with your own team and by so doing utilised a valuable method through which I could monitor the effectiveness of your officers and the thoroughness of their enquiries.

DEPTH AND AREAS OF MY INVESTIGATION

49. These have been very considerable and I would summarise them as follows :-

i] All the files, statements and exhibits of the whole of the 1980 investigation by your R.U.C. team have been meticulously examined and discussed with members of your investigating team to ultimately confirm their absolute credibility.

ii] We have re-interviewed all victims, hostel residents and material witnesses whom we could possibly locate who had been traced by the 1980 R.U.C. investigation team. We have also seen many others whom we thought it was particularly important to re-interview although they had made non-material statements initially in order to check the veracity of their statements and to ensure that nothing had been overlooked or omitted.

This was specifically aimed at tracing any of the individuals involved so as to reconcile their accounts with the stories published in the press. These enquiries took my team to most parts of the United Kingdom.

iii] Again we applied this principle of re-interviewing to a high proportion of the Police officers and politicians who had earlier been seen by D/Superintendent, [REDACTED] team.

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iv] We saw all those journalists who from their articles appeared to have information which would assist in the investigation.

v] The three principal offenders, MAINS, SEMPLE and McGRATH, were re-interviewed in prison by my team on two occasions.

vi] We traced amongst the already known witnesses, by very careful and sometimes repeated interviews, those who could best be described as the "sources" used by the press in formulating their articles.

vii] A continuous watching brief has been maintained by my team of all the ongoing R.U.C. enquiries and we interviewed, of our own choosing, a percentage of the witnesses and we scrutinised all the files subsequently prepared by your team for the Director of Public Prosecutions. This continuous overlooking was accomplished with the utmost co-operation from your own staff which extended far beyond the mere act of conformity with general instructions they had been given.

s.F40(2) Your Assistant Chief Constable, Mr. John WHITESIDE, and
s.F40(2)(a) Detective Superintendent [REDACTED] and his staff
s.F40(2)(b) entered most fully into the spirit, as well as the letter of the
s.F40(3)(a) instructions they had been given, and it was made crystal
s.F40(3)(ai) clear from their attitude that they recognised just what had to be done and they were prepared to assist in every way possible.

MY CONCLUSIONS

50. It is of particular significance to state under this heading that the Director of Public Prosecutions having received and given what I can only describe as very careful consideration of all of the reports which concluded the enquiries by your R.U.C. team, the contents of which we were aware, has decided that no further action should be taken against any persons for criminal offences.

51. My conclusions after the fullest possible investigation are :-

a] There is absolutely no evidence that residents of any children's home were involved in anything remotely resembling homosexual "rings" as asserted by the media or the latter's contentions that this so called ring involved Police officers, civil servants, military personnel, Justices of the Peace or legal people.

b] There was no cover up or concealment of evidence or disciplinary breaches by the R.U.C. personnel. There was some degree of lack of awareness over information/intelligence but this was at a time of intense terrorist activity which placed an excessive strain on Police resources and undoubtedly dictated priorities. There was, therefore, at this time an understandable inability to recognise that extremely vague information which arose in 1974, if probed thoroughly, may well have revealed that which was finally discovered in your 1980 investigations. In 1976 there was some other information which was not thoroughly recognised as relating to that

which came to hand in 1974. In no way, however, by any stretch of imagination was this a question of a cover up, only, I repeat, a lack of awareness, of interpretation and recognition. Any later critics had the benefit of what never exists at the time, namely, hindsight. In fact, it was D/Superintendent [REDACTED] excellent work which ultimately focussed attention upon this !

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c] No complaint was ever received by the Police from any victim at Kincora or other boys' homes of homosexual abuse by the staff until your 1980 enquiry team was launched. In the absence of such complaints there are constraints and limits to the action which can be taken by the Police on the basis of unsubstantiated rumour or allegations even where they emanate from well-motivated and genuine people. That being said there were several occasions when, through inadequacy or inefficiency, insufficient cognizance was taken by supervisory officers of the implications of information, which unsupported and lacking credibility from its original source, should nevertheless have attracted greater interest and a more positive response. I do not consider, however, despite those lapses of professionalism, that an earlier investigation would reasonably have been prompted on the basis of the information available to those officers.

d] Your team's investigation in 1980 and indeed their continuing activities endeavoured but could not establish the existence of any para-military organisation connected with the homosexual misconduct in any boys' home or of any attempts to recruit persons to a para-military organisation through residents in a boys' hostel. My team's enquiries also covered this ground fully and we can confirm the conclusions of your team that no such viable para-military organisation in fact exists beyond an ideological concept of a few ineffectual individuals with hopes and aspirations which never materialised or reached the stage of criminal activity. However, we traced evidence that a member of the Eastern Health & Social Services Board in Belfast was put off from exercising properly his supervisory role because it was believed that one of the Kincora H

namely, McGRATH had strong para-military links. This resulted out of personal fear in a failure to investigate matters with homosexual connotations or pass to the Police information.

e] Because of the articles in the media I went to great lengths to afford the maximum facility to the various reporters for them to produce evidence to support their stories and assertions. Each was particularly asked to provide to me evidence or the identity of witnesses who could substantiate their allegations of a "homosexual ring" etc. or to inform me of anything which they considered the R.U.C.'s team had not discovered. No fresh or real evidence whatsoever was provided to me from any of the reporters despite my emphasis that it was important for them to give it. Equally they could not or would not give to me the names of any credible witnesses, victims or suspects who might fall into this category.

When considering this against the general tenor of the press articles which convey a sense of righteous indignation on their part that nothing was done despite the evidence they claim was available, I am bound to conclude that they had no such evidence.

In consequence I am satisfied that no further evidence in fact exists and the stories that were produced for public consumption for whatever reason fall under that well known guise of investigative journalism !

Having said that, however, there can be no doubt that the item by the Chief News Reporter of the Irish Independent Newspaper published on 24th January 1980, although containing some erroneous detail, was substantially correct. It v

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this which led to your team under D/Superintendent [REDACTED] being formed and uncovering the whole sordid affair.

In that connection I refer earlier to our having traced the media's sources of information; the basis of this newspaper article clearly emanated from Social Workers whose integrity and dedication compelled them to do something that might ensure the matter was ventilated.

f] My terms of reference did not require me, as I have mentioned in the early part of this report, to investigate as such the shortcomings of the Social Services Departments. Nonetheless it is evident that there was a high degree of naivety, incompetence and in some instances an avoidance of responsibility by members of that very vital Service. My assumption is that those matters will be looked at internally and remedied.

g] Following that point I am sure and I firmly conclude that the marked ineffectiveness of those required to staff childrens homes was occasioned by those so appointed being of very low calibre in regard to suitability and experience for the work they really were required to undertake. Indeed the system of elected representatives performing a regular overlooking and supervisory function appears to be nothing more than a "rubber stamping exercise".

h] If a better system of formalised liaison, as between what was the Children's Department and now the Social Services and the Police, had then existed, the Police would have been enabled to know quite early of matters in the childrens' homes and preventive action and criminal proceedings ta'

need for some prosecutions would then never have arisen.

i] In spite of the extensive enquiries carried out by the R.U.C. team in 1980 and subsequently, and all of the work undertaken by my team in re-interviewing, no further complaints of homosexual activity from any Kincora inmates were received. I, therefore, conclude that so far as is humanly possible all complaints have been registered, investigated and proceeded with according to the evidence, and there certainly is nothing which could be justifiably interpreted by the media as amounting to anything remotely resembling a homosexual prostitution ring.

j] In [a] above I deal with what I can only describe as the fictional allegations about a homosexual prostitution ring. However, in view of the comments regularly featured in the media, I think I should add further emphasis to the fact that with my team I have particularly looked to see if any evidence at all can be found to indicate an involvement in any homosexual practices by British officials in the Northern Ireland Office or any action by them to suppress Police enquiries in this connection. I conclude without hesitation that there is no justification in this allegation and that no evidence exists.

k] The media have also given a degree of prominence to the fact that some Military circles were aware of homosexual mis-practice in the Kincora Boys' Hostel. The Military sources have been very frank with me and perfectly open during the ongoing enquiry by your own team under D/Superintendent [REDACTED]. Let me say quite clearly that once more I sought evidence from all sources incl

s.F40(2)
s.F40(2)(a)
s.F40(2)(b)
s.F40(3)(a)
s.F40(3)(ai)

media with negative result.

RECOMMENDATIONS

52. Arising from the whole my recommendations are few but very firmly based as follows :-

i] An enquiry within the Social Services elements in the Province appears highly desirable to prevent shortcomings which have been clearly revealed, and in my view this can only be effectively accomplished by practical contact during the enquiry with members of my team. This should encompass more careful consideration as to the recruitment and screening of persons suitable for employment in residential homes; their qualifications which may well be reflected by the remuneration they receive are vital. In fact there is clearly a desperate need within this selection process to eliminate from any appointments persons with a propensity towards misbehaviour with young persons under their care.

ii] As a consequence of the last recommendation it follows that the best possible training should be afforded to all Social Workers. This particularly relates to basic practicalities leading towards the elimination of naivety and lack of worldliness by those who have to deal with the complexity of the well-being of young persons. Therefore, the whole history of the Kincora Hostel saga should form the basis of hard bitter experience which should convey how a repetition can best be avoided.

iii] I feel that some not over-elaborate form of education should be evolved of children placed in care, especially having regard to their often previous unfortunate backgrounds with the object of creating a sensible but not fearful awar

dangers which can arise; in other words a sensible and practical realism of proper sex education.

iv] A complaints system should be considered which will effectively perceive, receive and investigate matters of doubt over the conduct of supervisory staff in charge of children so that important issues are not stopped at a lower level without proper scrutiny. In order to do this there should be a Police involvement as my enquiry shows a very real lack of awareness as to what is criminal misconduct or a tendency in that direction.

v] Consideration should be given to the appointment of an officer of Inspector rank on each Division as the main point of liaison between the Local Authorities and the Police so that there is no hesitation over the channels available and the confidentiality of approaches which might arise from those in care of children who need views and guidance. These officers should be under another of appropriate rank at Force Headquarters for the overall co-ordination of the Force's efforts in this connection.

vi] There should be practically based training of junior Detectives in regard to the detection of homosexual offences committed upon children, and once again I would suggest that the lessons to be learned from the Kincora enquiry should form the basis. This training should include the philosophical aspects of the development of good liaison as between the Police and the Social Services who have a responsibility for children who can be exposed to danger. The same aspects of Police work, particularly relating to decision-making and direction of operational work, should be included in the training syllabus for all Inspectors.

FINAL COMMENT


53. I am certain that from the exhaustive enquiries carried out by your own team and my own that there is no need for effort and time to be expended on further enquiries into this rather distasteful matter. It has already been more than fully ventilated and in my view from the many contacts that we have established, any further steps that might be taken would only serve as an undesirable platform perhaps for political or religious reasons and also to a lesser degree by a few who have entirely self-centred motives in wanting to be involved.

54. As I believe I have indicated earlier, whilst the media must be given full credit for the initial exposure, subsequent publicity has not been well based and has virtually developed into a discrediting campaign against what I can best describe simply as "the establishment". There has been an inclination in my view for the headline writers and the orators to take the issue out of the context of the era in time when society in fact was more concerned for the preservance of other ingredients in life of more immediate significance.

55. It seems to me that the task for collective society in Ulster in writing its next page of history should be to ensure the future does not repeat the errors and omissions. It should be more genuinely accepted that any tragedy for a small element of society must be the fault of the whole in one way or another, and this cannot be more true than in the last decade or so !

s.F40(2)
s.F40(2)(a)
s.F40(2)(b)
s.F40(3)(a)
s.F40(3)(ai)

56. Finally I must with every sincerity commend the assiduousness and the integrity of the investigation which has been carried out by your own enquiry team headed by Detective Superintendent [REDACTED] and co-ordinated by Mr. John WHITESIDE, your Assistant Chief Constable.



Sir George Terry.
Chief Constable of Sussex.

CWRT/PW
27th May 1983.